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Economic Precarity, Race, and Voting Structures
Atiba R. Els a
INTRODUCTION
Recently, the State of Alabama announced it would be dosing thirty-one part-
time driver's license offices located in rural (and largely minority) areas of the state
to close a budget shortfall.2 Alabama, a state that has recently adopted "strict" voter
identification laws,3 claimed that these closures would not affect availability of the
required ID credentials, though advocates argued that these closures would have a
substantial impact on the ability to obtain government-issued identification and
thus disproportionately affect the ability of poor minority voters to exercise their
right to vote.4
This dispute is the latest in the broad debates over whether recent judicial and
legislative changes create undue difficulties in the exercise of the right to vote.
Voter identification laws and other forms of voter regulation occurred in the wake
of the Supreme Court of the United States decision in Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board, which upheld Indiana's voter identification laws against a facial
challenge against their constitutionality.' These changes have accelerated in the
1 Professor of Law, West Virginia University. The author wishes to thank the staff of the Kentucky
LawJournal for their hospitality during their recent Election Law Symposium. In particular, the author
wishes to thank Professor Joshua Douglas and Mr. Mark Roth for their thoughtfulness and
accommodation of the author. The author also wishes to acknowledge the support of Dean Gregory
Bowman of the West Virginia University College of Law and the Hodges/Bloom Research Fund for
support of this research. The author also wishes to extend thanks to Elizabeth Stryker and Benjamin
Hogan for excellent research assistance. All errors and omissions remain the author's own. Comments
are welcome and may be directed to atiba.ellis@mail.wvu.edu.
2 See Press Release, State of Ala. L. Enft Agency, ALEA Reallocates Personnel to District Driver
License Offices (Sept. 30,2015), http://www.alea.gov/Home/wFlyerDetail.aspx?ID=2&PK=ea439937-
97c5-4ab6-894a-e0e27c6e8d91.
3 Alabama passed its current voter identification regime in 2011. The National Conference of State
Legislatures (NCSL) has defined a "strict" voter identification law as one that requires "voters without
acceptable identification [to] vote on a provisional ballot and [to] take additional steps after Election
Day for [the ballot] to be counted." See Voter Identitication Requirements / Voter ID Laws, NAT'L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 19, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/voter-id.aspx. NCSL notes, however, that the Alabama voter ID law may arguably not be
considered "strict" in that it contains a provision allowing two governmental workers to verify the
identity of the voter by affidavit and thus allow the voter to cast a final ballot. Id. tbl. 1, n. 2. It is this
identification provision (called the "Positively Identify Provision") that is at issue in Greater
Birmingham Ministries v. Alabama. See Complaint at 78-81, Greater Birmingham Ministries v.
Alabama, No. 2:15-CV-02193-LSC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18891 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 2, 2015). This
will be discussed below in Part IV.
4 See Mike Cason, State to Close 5 Parks, Cut Back Services at Driver License Oflces, AL.COM
(Oct. 30, 2015 1:21 PM),
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/09/state-announces to dose becau.html.
5 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008).
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wake of the Court's decision in Shelby County v. Holder, which struck down
Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and thus rendered ineffective the
preclearance provisions of Section 5.
6
In the wake of Crawford and Shelby County,' state legislatures have passed a
new wave of voting laws, which have, in particular, elicited lawsuits over how these
new laws regulate the way voters authenticate their identification at the polls,9 the
way voters may access polling places,"0 the time voters may access their vote,1' and
other regulatory matters. 12 Proponents of these laws have claimed that such
regulations are necessary to protect the integrity of elections and to guard against
the threat of voter fraud. 13 Scholars have observed that the opponents of these laws
argue that this expansion of laws related to voting serves to suppress votes, and in
particular, the votes of racial minorities, the young, the elderly, and the poor.14
These new regulations, which I have previously called the "hyper-regulation" of the
voting process, 15 occur on the backdrop of generations of express and implicit
barriers to enfranchisement, often referred to as first- and second-generation
barriers to the right to vote. 6
Laws like poll taxes and felon disenfranchisement laws fall in the first-
generation category because they either directly or implicitly target vulnerable
groups and were mostly abolished in the wake of the voting rights revolution of the
1960s on the basis of asserting an antidiscrimination norm in the enforcement of
6 As Alabama was a covered jurisdiction under Section 5, it would not have been able to implement
these closings until the changes were approved by either a federal court or the United States Department
ofJustice. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
7 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 181.
1 Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2612.
9 See Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:15CV357-HEH, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118647, at
*3 (E.D. Va. Sept. 4,2015).
10 See League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 231-32 (4th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015).
1 See id; Complaint at 3-4, Ohio Org. Collaborative v. Husted, No. 2:15-CV-01802, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 85699 (S.D. Ohio May 24, 2015).
12 Kobach v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm'n, 772 F.3d 1183, 1187-88 (10th Cit. 2014)
(requiring proof of citizenship to register to vote in state elections); Evenwel v. Perry, No. A-14-CV-
335-LY-CH-MHS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156192, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2014) (challenging
Texas' re-districting plan under the one-person-one-vote doctrine).
" SeeAtiba R. Ellis, The Meme of Voter Fraud, 63 CATH. L. REV. 879, 903-06 (2014).
14 See, e.g, Daniel P. Tokaji, Appljing Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 439, 482, 489 (2015); L. Darnell Weeden, The Supreme Court's Rejection of the Rational Basis
Standard in Shelby County v. Holder Invites Voter Suppression, 33 MISS. C. L. REV. 219, 227-29
(2014). See generally Ian Vandewalker & Keith Gunnar Bentele, Vulnerability in Numbers Racial
Composition of the Electorate, Voter Suppression, and the Voting Rights Act, 18 HARV. LATINO L.
REV. 99 (2015).
I5 See Atiba R. Ellis, Tiered Personhood and the Excluded Voter, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463,
478-85 (2015).
16 M. Akram Faizer, Reinforced Polarization: How the Roberts Court's Recent Decision to
Invalidate the Voting Rights Act's Coverage Formula Will Exacerbate the Divisions that Bedevil U.S.
Society, 45 CuMB. L. REV. 303, 306, 327 (2015).
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the right to vote.17 Voter identification laws and other laws that diminish the scope
of access to the vote fall in the second-generation category because they serve a
facially neutral general purpose, yet there is genuine disagreement as to whether
their effect is discriminatory by virtue of their mounting cumulative burden. "
While the distinction between the two generations seems to be both temporal and
based on the premise of express targeting of disfavored populations versus a
categorization that speaks to facially neutral laws of general applicability that
nonetheless have a discriminatory effect, the Alabama DMV closure situation
appears to represent a new problem.
Specifically, the Alabama DMV situation represents a concern that states
cannot afford such laws and that, as in Alabama's case, the effects of such barriers
of access would be shifted to those who can least stand the impact-poor
minorities. While the underlying claim of vote suppression is not new, the problem
presented by the Alabama situation points to the intersection of systemic economic
impact with vote suppression concerns. Arguably, the structures of historic, racially
disparate poverty have coincided with the need for austerity that the state claims,
putting at risk the right to vote for those poor black Alabamians who are at the
intersection of race and class. This would suggest that the Alabama situation is
unique in the sense that structural forces outside of voting rights concerns are
effectively recalibrating the right to vote.' 9
This recalibration has several dimensions.20 This Article explores one of them:
the evolution of an underlying utilitarian conception of the right to vote in the
federal Constitution, framed as it is expressed in Crawforj' and Shelby County,22
and the impact of that in subsequent lower court decisions. I have argued in the
7 Felon disenfranchisement laws are the notable exception to this dynamic. For more on this, see
Ellis, supra note 15, at 478-85.
18 See id
" Legal historian Stuart Chinn has deployed the concept of "recalibration" to argue that "the
Supreme Court possesses an institutional interest in promoting stability" that limits radical
transformations in the social order and, therefore, will calibrate broad-based reforms to re-entrench the
previously existing social order. STUART CHINN, RECALIBRATING REFORM: THE LIMITS OF
POLITICAL CHANGE 40-43 (2014). 1 discuss his work in a broader context of American civil rights
equality in Atiba R. Ellis, Reviving the Dream: Equality and the Democratic Promise in the Post-Civil
Rights Era, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 789 (2014). This is a core premise of the argument that follows,
especially in light of the nature of the utilitarianism concerns described in this Article.
'0 Because of its multi-dimensional nature and the space constraints of this Article, the analysis here
must necessarily be limited to forecasting the groundwork for future work that thinks broadly about the
larger extent of the scope and consequences of the recalihration of the right to vote. Such work will use
Chinn's term along with an expansive understanding of how the idea of equality of political
participation through voting has been "recalibrated" based on racial, economic, political, and other bases.
As I argued during the symposium, the right to vote seems to be in a in the midst of a long-term
modem reealibration driven by the Supreme Court that itself reinforces the underlying structural
concerns (and creates a blindness to structural disenfranchisement concerns). In light of recent political
changes and the shift in the majority on the Court itself, this recalibration appears destined to continue
for the foreseeable future. I will address these trends in future work.
21 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
22 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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past that this aspect of the recalibration of the right to vote represents deference to
state priorities regarding the federal constitutional enforcement of the right, a
balancing that effectively prioritizes state interests in administration over voter
access, thus leading to excessive and cumulative regulation. 23 This deference is
"utilitarian" in the sense that this is premised upon the vindication of larger state
interests that would effectively serve the good of the majority-indeed, the greatest
number--of voting citizens even if there is a marginal expense to a relative few.
This would presumably cause courts considering this kind of problem-of indirect
structural disenfranchisement due to policy concerns outside of the election law
context-to defer to the state's interest concerning the diminished availability of
opportunities for obtaining the credentials necessary to vote in a "strict" voter
identification state due to the more pressing concern of financial exigency.
That such an outcome would be correct within this frame points to both a
larger trend in the more general recalibration of the law of voter access as described
above and would illustrate a new dimension in the problem of structural
disenfranchisement. This recognition points us to a larger concern about the
incompleteness and incoherence of this conception of the right to vote, the
conception that dominates current precedent. This short Article will examine the
evolution of the utilitarian frame, demonstrate how the incoherence of this
argument has evolved since Shelby Count, and then conclude with a preliminary
examination of the structural flaw illustrated by the Alabama DMV situation.
This Article will do so in the following manner. Part I will describe the
evolution of this utilitarian balancing assumption in the Court's modern voter
access jurisprudence, and show how it has come to shape the internal structural
election law concerns. Part II will provide an account of vote suppression claims
since Shelby Countr/4 to demonstrate the arguable consequences since the shift
created by Crawforals and Shelby Countr26 Part III will then conclude the Article
by discussing the Alabama DMV situation. It will analogize this situation to other
indirect structural concerns, which in the context of jurisdictions covered by
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were addressed through federal
supervisory power. This kind of intervention effectively maintained a balance
between individualistic concerns in terms of exercise of the franchise and the
utilitarian concerns raised in the context of race-conscious regulation of the
franchise, which may effectively ignore marginal individual concerns for state
interests in voting or otherwise.
This Article will end with concluding comments that suggest how we may
remedy this problem through reconsidering this utilitarian assumption. Such
reconsideration may manifest itself through a readjustment of the balance to defer
'3 Atiba R. Ellis, A Price Too High: Efficiencies, Voter Suppression, and the Redefining of
Citizenship, 43 Sw. L. REv. 549 (2014) [hereinafter, Ellis, Price]
24 Id.
25 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 181.
26 Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2612.
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to voter interests instead of state interests, a revived Section 5 preclearance scheme
which would restore the federal government's interpositionary power regarding
direct and indirect structural voting rights changes in jurisdictions, like Alabama,
where such history and potential for discrimination would be present. While that
would address the present situation, such a remedy would be insufficient to deal
with the situations where this concern would manifest in other jurisdictions which
may not otherwise fall under a revised Section 4(b) preclearance formula or would
otherwise be subject to either a Section 2 racial discrimination suit or may fall out
of coverage of the Voting Rights Act altogether. Such gaps would suggest instead a
modification in the way we consider the right to vote generally through taking
seriously, in a voter-friendly way, the concept of disparate impact and forcing the
collective to bear the burden of effecting the core promise of the right to vote.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE UTILITARIAN FRAME IN RIGHT TO VOTE
JURISPRUDENCE
The key premise of this Article's discussion is that voting must be administered
in an efficient way that yields the benefit of fairly administered elections to the
greatest number of people. While this premise is in and of itself innocuous, this
Article builds upon my prior work that argues that this efficiency assumption has
come to dominate considerations by the courts of the right to vote in an arguably
dangerous way and that it is recalibrating the meaning of citizenship in the United
States.27 This efficiency thesis has three components: (1) that there is generally
great deference to state authority concerning general election administration that
does not implicate constitutional issues; (2) that, within this zone of deference,
election law decisions weigh state interests in efficiency with harm to the voter; and
that (3) from this frame, incidental voter denials premised on risk are acceptable if
outweighed by governmental interests in establishing the regulation. 2' This section
will explore these three assumptions in turn.
A. Structurally-Established Deference to State Dominance in Right to
Vote Regulation.
In recognizing this contemporary deference to state authority, it is important to
first acknowledge that the original constitutional design related to the franchise did
defer to the states.' Under the electoral scheme at the time of the founding, the
right to vote was largely left to state control. States could determine who was and
27 See Ellis, Price, supra note 23. This section and the next are based upon research I initially
presented in Price. However, where Price sought to simply look at the Anderson/Burdick balancing test
critically, this Article extends that reasoning by discussing recent court trends in voting rights litigation.
28 d.
29 See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2271 (2013) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (citing United States v. Gradwell, 243 U. S. 376 (1917)).
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who was not eligible to vote with little federal constitutional oversight.3" States
varied in terms of selecting what qualifications would be sufficient to determine
who could vote, but they were largely driven by some determination of whether one
possessed sufficient standing within the particular state and local political
community to do so. This was often determined by property regulation or other
basis for establishing an ownership stake in the community.31
This deference to state interests, with only a marginal qualification through
federal power in the context of federal elections, shifted after the Civil War. The
Reconstruction Amendments both directly and impliedly impacted voting.32 The
Fourteenth Amendment required that each state provide all of their citizens with
equal access to the "privileges and immunities" " of citizenship and "equal
protection of the laws."34
After the Civil War, the Reconstruction Amendments expressly addressed the
right to vote. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed that "No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
the citizens of the United States; . . . nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." 3 Moreover, Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment created a penalty for states that disenfranchised male citizens on any
basis "except for participation in rebellion, or other crimes." 3 6 The Fifteenth
'0 The original United States Constitution said little about the right to vote. Specifically, Article I,
Section 2 of the Constitution expressly set out that the people could choose their representatives to the
House, which was taken to mean by popular election in accordance to the rules set out by each
individual state. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. Similarly, the Constitution expressly left the process of these
elections to state legislatures while reserving a right to qualify such regulations through legislation. U.S.
CONST. art I, § 4, c. 1 ("The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators."); see also Inter-
Tribal Council ofAriz, 133 S. Ct. at 2272 (Alito, J., dissenting).
3l See Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost ofthe Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and the Price of
Democracy, 86 DENV. U. L. REv. 1023, 1038 (2009) [hereinafter Ellis, The Cost of the Vote] (quoting
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE
UNITED STATES 29 (2000)). It is worth observing that this dual federal/state structure created the
opportunity for states to regulate their own vote in differing ways. See generally KEYSSAR, supra note 31,
for a history of the range of voting regulations. Also, this does create an opportunity for not only
retrogressive innovation (which is the focus of this Article), but also progressive innovation regarding
the right to vote. Professor Joshua A. Douglas has consistently made this point in his work. See, e.g.,
Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 95, 101
(2014).32 See U.S. CONST. amends. XII, XIV, XV.33 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
34 id.
35Id.
36 Id. § 2. In light of the decision in Shelby County, scholars have sought to consider the import of
the Fourteenth Amendment in ways separate and apart from the Anderson/Burdick balancing test I
critique here. Indeed, Franita Tolson has argued that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as
interpreted through the scope of the voting rights penalty provisions of Section 2 offers a vehicle for
broad congressional power to enact legislation directed at voting rights enforcement. See Franita Tolson,
The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89 WASH. L. REV. 379 (2014). Similarly,
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Amendment ordered that "the right of citizens . .. to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude."
37
These limitations defined the impermissible boundaries of racial discrimination
to insure that freed African slaves, who were now citizens by the terms of the
Fourteenth Amendment, could participate in the political process. The Court
enforced these negative limitations in literal terms, as in Guinn v. United States,
where the Court struck down racially motivated "grandfather clauses" designed to
subject African Americans to literacy tests but exempt whites.
38
But where the formal application of the rules did not directly effect the express
anti-racial discrimination terms of the amendments, the Court deferred to state
laws. The Court made such deference in Wiliams v. Mississippi, when it upheld
Mississippi's poll tax that acted as an exclusionary mechanism against African
Americans. 39 The Court reasoned that the plaintiff had failed to show any
discriminatory administration of the suffrage provisions despite the claim that the
poll tax had such an effect, and thus he failed to state a claim under the Equal
Protection Clause. 0 Moreover, the Court in this period deferred to state
definitions of voter eligibility that did not implicate the Fifteenth Amendment.
This was made clear in Minor v. Happersett, in which the Court upheld state
provisions that mandated that women would not be allowed the right to vote.4"
Moreover, Breedlove v. Suttles confirmed this underlying doctrine of deference to
state control unless there was a federal constitutional grounds that defined the
particular issue regarding the right to vote.' In Breedlove, the Court once again
upheld the poll tax and found that the right to vote was not derived from the
federal Constitution, but from the individual states, subject only to the constraints
on the right to vote imposed by the Constitution.43 On this basis, "a state may
condition suffrage as it deems appropriate."'
However, these race-conscious protections of the right to vote only came into
useful expression nearly forty years later through a constitutional amendment and
the passage of the Voting Rights Act.45 The Twenty-Fourth Amendment in 1964
Michael T. Morley has pointed to Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of congressional
power to regulate the right to vote under a remedial deterrence approach. See Michael T. Morley,
Remedial Equilibration and the Right to Vote Under Section 2 of the Pburteenth Amendment, 2015 U.
Ci LEGAL F. 279 (2015).37 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
31 See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 367-68 (1915).
' SeeWilliams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1898).40 Id.
41 See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 177-78 (1875). The Nineteenth Amendment repealed
this holding. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.").
42 Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283-84 (1937).
43 Id. at 283.
44id.
45 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered
sections 52 U.S.C.).
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abolished the poll tax in federal elections. 6 That same year, Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act, and in 1965 Congress passed the Voting Rights Act. Both
statutes gave the federal government the ability to protect the right to vote of
minority citizens. 7
Indeed, the Voting Rights Act implemented by statute the principles the
Fifteenth Amendment was intended to protect." The Act sets forth a national
cause of action for racial discrimination in voting in Section 2,9 and, until Shelby
County v. Holder,"° provided for preclearance (or pre-approval) of election laws for
jurisdictions that had a history of discrimination in voting and evidence of disparate
rates of participation between whites and minorities within that jurisdiction. 51
Additionally, the Court in two important lines of precedent created a layer of
federal protection for the right to vote through its own jurisprudence. In a line of
cases beginning with Reynolds v. Sims, the Court's recognized the doctrine of one
person, one vote.12 Additionally, in Harper v. Virginia State Board ofElections, the
Court, in holding that the state poll tax violated the equal protection and due
process dauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, deemed the right to vote a
fundamental right.53
B. The Evolution of the Anderson -Burdick-Crawford Balancing Test
While direct denials of the right to vote on the basis of race ended, claims
regarding election procedures which either implicated aggregates of voters or
regulations that did not implicate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments which
tended to nonetheless have an effect of dissuading certain classes of voters from
voting evolved. The Court's approach to these claims has been to balance the
concerns of the state and of voters where the regulations "protect the integrity and
'6 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
41 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat 241 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. at 437.41 Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The Death of
a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389, 1394-1403 (2015) (describing the scope of the Voting Rights
Act as remedying the problem of racial discrimination in voting and implementing the command of the
Fifteenth Amendment); Gilda R. Daniels, Racial Reistricting in a Post-Racial World, 32 Cardozo L.
Rev. 947, 951-52 (2011) (describing the importance of the Voting Rights Act as a means of combatting
racial discrimination in voting).
41 Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 79 Stat. at 437 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. 10301 (2006)).
'0 Shelby Ctyv. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
5142 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (West 2016).
52 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66, 568 (1964). That is, the Court required under the
Fourteenth Amendment that election districts be roughly proportional in size (based on the general
population of the jurisdiction) so that each individual voter's vote would be of equal weight. This
ruling transformed the nature of redistricting in the United States and imposed substantial burdens
for state legislatures to conform their districts to meet this constitutional standard. Id. at 368. The
Court recently reaffirmed this principle in Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).
" See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that poll taxes in
state elections violate the findamental right to vote); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 670.
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reliability of the electoral process itself."54 The Court suggested a balancing test to
assess the constitutionality of a challenged election law to be used on a case-by-case
basis:
[The Court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the
plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests
put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In
passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength
of each of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those interests
burden the plaintiffs rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing
court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is
unconstitutional.5
The Court first articulated this test in Anderson v. Celebrezze, which found for
then-presidential candidate John Anderson concerning his argument that an earlier
deadline for filing for independent candidates placed disproportionate burdens on
such candidates.5 6 The Court applied the test again in Burdick v. Takushi, which
upheld certain limitations set out in the Hawaiian write-in ballot law that
prevented certain voters from casting their ballot preferences. 5' However, in
BurdicA the Court evaluated the injury to the claimant's First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights prior to any balancing of the claimant's rights against the
governmental injury. 8
The Court then followed this balancing approach in Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board." There, by a 6-3 majority, the Court upheld the Indiana
voter identification law.6 Justice Stevens' "Lead Opinion" applied the Burdick test
and determined that the state's interest in enforcing the voter identification law
outweighed any impact that the statute would have on potential voters shut out by
the law. 6' The Court, on a scant record, credited Indiana's claim to need the law to
maintain election integrity and discredited (for want of evidence) the plaintiffs'
claims that the law would directly disenfranchise voters. 62 The Scalia opinion,
concurring in the result, contended that the law was a reasonable regulation subject
to rational basis review, and that the government has a rational basis for the law.'
The dissents argued that there was sufficient evidence of harm to the plaintiffs to
4 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n. 9 (1983).
55 Id. at 789.
16 Id. at 782-83, 789.
17 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430, 434 (1992).
51 Id. at 434.
59 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
60 Id. at 185, 188-89.
61 Id. at 189-96, 202-03.
62 See id. at 196-204.
63 See id. at 204-09.
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justify striking down the law,' and that the nonexistence of voter fraud cases
undermined the government's purported justification for the law.6 5 Despite the
disagreement over the evidence, Crawford represents the Court's latest consensus
that this utilitarian balancing between the interests of the voter and the interest of
the state is the standard for approaching election regulations.
C. Wholesale Deference and the Risk ofDismissing Harms
Similarly, the wholesale deference to state standards for election regulations
generally has come to prominence once again in Shelby County v. Holder.' In
Shelby County, the Court struck down the formula used to determine which
jurisdictions should be covered under the Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, thus
disabling that section's preclearance provisions.67 The Court did so based upon two
major premises. First, the Court argued that each state is due "equal sovereignty,"
that is each state has power to regulate matters left to the states, including voting,
to the same extent as other states. 68 The second premise of the majority was that
"the conditions that originally justified [the preclearance measures that justified
differing treatment of states] no longer characterize voting in the covered
jurisdictions."69 Specifically, ChiefJustice Roberts pointed to substantial progress in
voter participation and the increase in minority elected officials since the Voting
Rights Act was passed;7" yet, the majority found that the current coverage formula
does not reflect this reality.7 Because the Court determined the justification of
racial disparity no longer exists, the formula and its consequent burdening of some
states under Section 5 was no longer warranted.72 The dissenting opinion rejected
both of these claims: It argued that the majority failed to defer to congressional
judgment concerning the constitutional powers it had to prevent racial
discrimination in voting under the Fifteenth Amendment, inappropriately invoked
the doctrine of "equal sovereignty,"73 and that the factual contentions regarding the
64 Id. at 217-21 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 237 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (dissenting on the
basis that the burdens on the voters are substantial and had not been taken into account by the state).
65 Id. at 224-30 (Souter, J., dissenting).
I Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
67 See id. at 2624.
65 Id. at 2623-24.
69 Id. at 2618.70 d. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 2627-28 (majority opinion) ("Coverage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated
practices.... Racial disparity in those numbers was compelling evidence justifying the preclearance
remedy and the coverage formula. There is no longer such a disparity.").
' See id. at 2631 ("Our country has changed, and while any racial discrimination in voting is too
much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current
conditions.").
73 Id. at 2636-37, 2648-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that the principle of equal
sovereignty "applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the
remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared") (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 328-29 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2612).
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existence of racially discriminatory activities in voting were in error. 7 Shelby
Countyhas effectively curtailed the scope of the Voting Rights Act and reinstituted
to a major degree the deference states had concerning voting regulations.
It is important to note, however, that this deference regarding state
administration of elections is counterbalanced by the role that the federal
government has in administrating elections by virtue of the fact that elections are
often for state and federal offices. When it comes to voting for federal elections,
and in particular the use of federal forms for voting, standards are defined by
federal law and cannot be overridden by state law. The Court so held in Arizona v.
Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona.75 There, the Court invalidated an Arizona law
requiring prospective voters to provide documentary proof of citizenship in order to
register to vote.76 In analyzing the validity of the law, the Court determined that
the National Voter Registration Act pre-empted the Arizona statute, as the NVRA
had created a federal voter registration form requiring only that the prospective
voter sign a statement swearing that he or she is a U.S. citizen.
77
These decisions demonstrate that the recent efforts of the Court have served to
maintain the constitutional boundaries regarding election regulations concerning
the separate spheres of the federal government and the state government. Moreover,
Shelby County demonstrates the receding power of the federal government
concerning the ability of the states to control these issues. When these decisions are
taken in conjunction with the deference accorded constitutional vote denial claims
under Anderson and Burdicl4 it would follow that unless some countervailing
concern dominates the field, such as race-conscious voting rights policy, and that
states may be free to dismiss claims of risk of disenfranchisement. However, this
section has also demonstrated that the concerns that do not implicate race
directly-whether constitutional or not-have come to be dominated by the
utilitarian balance evoked by Burick. These two factors set the stage for examining
the post-Shelby Countylegal landscape concerning voter access laws.
II. THE COSTS OF THE UTILITARIAN APPROACH TO VOTING RIGHTS
To this point, this Article has sought to describe the tension between
established structural norms concerning the right to vote and the development of
assumptions embedded within the more contemporary right to vote context.
Specifically, within the context of delegation of powers to implement the right to
vote to state governments, the efficiency norm (as defined here) has outweighed the
norms of antidiscrimination and increasing political participation, thus creating a
tension between these two essential policies concerning the right to vote. This
74 Id. at 2651-52.
7' Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253-54 (2013).
76 See id. at 2260.
77 Id.
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tension is expressed in contemporary voting rights litigation that addresses the
perceived harms created by overly burdensome voting regulations.
I have previously criticized this shift to a state-centric focus in terms of the
primacy given to election laws.78 This critique was based on the notion that this
shift created a blind spot in current law, in as much as it fostered "the inability to
appropriately criticize the harm involved in the day-to-day existence of the right to
vote."79 It argued that the utilitarian ends being served by modern voting law to the
exclusion of concerns for diminishing the individual citizen's exercise of their
voting rights.8" In particular, the critique argued that voter identification states
focus on fraud prevention to the extent that exclusion of voters on the margins
would be acceptable so long as such harm is outweighed by the exclusion of
fraudulent voters.8 '
In discussing this, I argued that there may exist a presumption among those
who arbitrate right-to-vote disputes from the constitutional frame described here
that there is a presumption that "the state's interest in administering elections
efficiently outweighs the interest of the voter in having efficient access to the
franchise.82 I then noted how, "under the utilitarian approach, it is also true that if
something were demonstrated as creating a direct harm to voting rights, [that is, an
express violation of the antidiscrimination norm] then the balance would tilt
towards supporting those rights."' However, absent hard evidence of such direct
exclusions, this utilitarian-oriented thought process defaults to an upholding of
voter identification laws, and in particular, those laws designed to protect the
integrity of elections.84
I also argued that this focus creates an inability for the election law structure to
address concerns regarding structural disenfranchisement such that the barriers that
prevent the marginalized from having the full opportunity to participate go under-
analyzed. By allowing an analysis that focuses on the greater good, the utilitarian
focus sets in arguable conflict the individual rights of voters who perceived
themselves as structurally disenfranchised against the mechanisms that determine
the collective good.8
This is particularly acute when it comes to the rights of racial minorities within
the context of the voting process. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act served as a
limitation on the collective interests within any particular state by forcing those
covered jurisdictions to insure that minority interests were not diminished. With
7 5SeegenerallyEllis, Price, supra note 23.
19 Id. at 562.
80 Id
11 Id. at 563.
' Id. at 564. Indeed, I commented that "[iln this utilitarian calculus, the greatest risk is that
ineligible voters will overwhelm the electoral process and create a result not intended by the majority of
eligible voters," of incidental exclusion of those who cannot bear the burden imposed. Id.
83 Id.
4Id. at 558.
5Id. at 567.
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Shelby County, however, the debate has been refrained as a contest between the
individual interests of each state verses the collective interests of the federal
government. With the vindication of the individual state interests, the underlying
relationship between the individual minority voter and the state that implements
her right to vote is open towards allowing the state's interests to trump.'
Of course, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does nonetheless allow for
litigation in these cases to remedy such structural defects, and I have elsewhere
conceded that even as I was making such claims that litigation was ongoing. In
light of this frame, this Article will now turn to recent voting fights litigation that
illustrates these tendencies and limitations.
III. THE UTILITARIAN FRAME IN ACTION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE
OF THE UTILITARIAN FRAME ON RECENT VOTER SUPPRESSION CASES
This conflict between individual and group collective voting rights on the one
hand, and the utilitarian claim for more efficient and secure election administration
on the other, has presented itself recently in the wake of Crawford and Shelby
County. These claims have most frequently arisen in litigation surrounding not
only voter identification, but also reduction in early voting, same-day registration,
no-excuse absentee voting, state inaction regarding long wait times, nonviolent
felon re-enfranchisement, and proof of citizenship requirements.87 Most of this
litigation focuses in particular on the disparate impact that the new regulations will
have on racial minorities; the poor, and other underrepresented groups. These cases
implicate the concerns raised in the prior section regarding individual versus
collective interests and the utilitarian balancing at the heart of voter participation
litigation.
The Sixth Circuit addressed these concerns in applying a preliminary injunction
for voters claiming disenfranchisement. In Ohio State Conference of the NAACP
v. Husted, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin changes in Ohio's early in-person voting
rules. 8 Plaintiffs sued under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
6Id. at 566.
" See, e.g., N.C. Conf of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding that North
Carolina legislature's implementation of voter identification law, modification of early voting regulations,
and modification of extended voter registration provisions violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216
(5th Cir. 2016) (holding that Texas's voter identification law violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act
through its discriminatory effects because it imposed significant and disparate burdens on the right to
vote, and the provisions failed to correspond to any meaningfil interest); Frank v. Walker, 819 F.3d 384
(7th Cir. 2016) (holding that plaintiffs who could not obtain qualifying voter identification through
reasonable effort were entitled to relief); Kobach v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm'n, 772 F.3d 1183
(10th Cir. 2014) (validating action by Executive Director of U.S. Election Assistance Commission to
deny adding proof of citizenship requirement to federal voter registration forms in Kansas and Arizona);
Griffin v. Pate, 884 N.W.2d 182 (Iowa 2016) (upholding Iowa felon disenfranchisement statute and
defining delivery of a controlled substance as an infamous crime under Iowa state constitution).
" Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 529 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated,
588 Fed. App'x 488 (6th Cir. 2014).
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Amendment and the Voting Rights Act. 9 The Sixth Circuit upheld the district
court's analysis finding that African Americans would be disproportionately
burdened by changes in early voting rules. 9" In evaluating the preliminary
injunction motion, the Sixth Circuit rejected the contention that rational basis
scrutiny applied, or that Crawford mandated the law in question be found facially
constitutional.9' The court applied the Anderson-Burdick test and found that the
burden outweighed the state's interest in preventing fraud, lowering expense, or
insuring uniformity in election systems.92 The Sixth Circuit believed plaintiffs had
demonstrated a likelihood of success on both their Equal Protection and Voting
Rights Act claims. 93 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit found Section 2's vote denial
doctrine applicable to early-voting systems and found that under the totality of the
circumstances the plaintiffs had a likelihood of success in winning their Voting
Rights Act claim.94 In particular, the court focused on the fact that this law would
most adversely affect minority voters of low income, and thus met the requirements
of a Section 2 violation. 95 To wit: "[T]he disproportionate burdens SB 238 and
Directive 2014-17 place on African Americans, combined with their lower-
socioeconomic status in Ohio, operate to give African American voters 'less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice."
96
While the Sixth Circuit articulated the Anderson-Burdick test and the Section
2 test in such a way as to justify an injunction, the Seventh Circuit squarely focused
on the utilitarian frame to deny an injunction concerning voting regulations. In
Frank v. Walker, the Seventh Circuit reversed an injunction against Wisconsin's
voter identification law.97 Plaintiffs had proceeded under the Equal Protection
standard of Burdick as well as under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.98 The
Seventh Circuit upheld the Wisconsin voter ID law on the grounds that the injury
the plaintiffs had demonstrated was insufficient to meet either of the constitutional
or statutory standards. 99 In what could be termed a caustic opinion, Judge
Easterbrook focused on the court's deference to legislative judgments as to the
purpose of photo ID laws (that they provide public confidence in the election
process) and the lack of measurable undue depression of turnout due to the law.00
8 Id.
?0 Id. at 542.
91 Id. at 542, 544.
9 Id. at 545-50.
93 Id. at 549, 560.
14 Id at 550-60.
95 Id. at 555-59.
96 Id. at 555 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2009)).
7 Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 745 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015).
98 See id. at 751 (In addition to suit under Crawford, "plaintiffs also contended, and the district
judge found, that the state law violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act"); id. at 754 (rejecting plaintiffi'
claims that Act 23 violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment).
9 See id
10o Id. at 750.
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In particular, during his opinion's Crawford analysis, Judge Easterbrook authored
the following telling passage:
If the public thinks that photo ID makes elections cleaner, then people are more
likely to vote or, if they stay home, to place more confidence in the outcomes.
These are substantial benefits. One district judge's contrary view is not enough to
condemn a state statute as unconstitutional. By contrast, a finding that a photo
ID law has significantly reduced the turnout in a particular state would imply that
the requirement's additional costs outweigh any benefit in improving confidence
in electoral integrity. As we have observed, however, the judge did not find that
photo ID laws measurably depress turnout in the states that have been using
them.
101
As to the Voting Rights Act claim, the Seventh Circuit found that the district
court had failed to look at the totality of the circumstances regarding the Wisconsin
voting system. 1 2 It went further to say that such an examination would prove that
even though there may be disparate outcomes on the basis of race, such outcomes
do not prove that the law substantially disadvantages people of color. 3
In League of Women Voters of North CaroUna v. North Carolina, the court
addressed the North Carolina General Assembly's substantial transformation the
state's election laws. 0 4 Prior to the enactment of House Bill 589, North Carolina
election laws provided for 17 days of early voting."' 5 In 2012, "more than 2.5
million people voted during early voting-more than half of all the ballots cast in
the election.""0 6 House Bill 589 reduces the early voting period by a full week.1 0
7
Plaintiffs alleged that minority voters would be disproportionately affected by the
reduction of early voting because of the narrowed window for to make alternative
arrangements for work, transportation, etc.10 House Bill 589 also imposed strict
voter identification requirements, prohibited local election boards from keeping the
polls open on the final Saturday before elections, eliminated same-day voter
registration, eliminated pre-registration of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds in high
schools, and barred votes cast in the wrong precinct from being counted at all.0 9
Plaintiffs sued under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, alleging racial
11 Id. at 751.
510 Id. at 754.
103 Id. at 753, 755.
o' League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 229 (4th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015).
105 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-227.2(b) (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2016-3, 2016 2nd Extra Sess.
2000).
1" Complaint at 9, League of Women Voters ofN. C., 769 F.3d 224 (Nos. 14-1845, 14-1856, 14-
1859).
107 See 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381 § 25.1 (reducing the time period from one that begins the third
Thursday before the election to the second Thursday before the election).
' Complaint at 17, League of Women Voters ofN.C., 769 F.3d 224 (Nos. 14-1845, 14-1856, 14-
1859).
'o 1Seegenerdlly2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381.
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discrimination in the creation of these laws.' Plaintiffs also sought a preliminary
injunction to prevent harm due to the enforcement of these provisions in upcoming
elections."'
In the League of Women Voters opinion, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the
Sixth Circuit as to the appropriate standard for vote denial claims under Section
2.112 It in particular acknowledged that there was not a balancing test under Section
2 that would "pit [the state's] desire for administrative ease against its minority
citizens' right to vote." 1 3 Under a standard that looked at the totality of the
circumstances to determine discriminatory effect, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court's denial of the preliminary injunction regarding same-day registration
and prohibition on counting out-of-precinct ballots." 4 The district court's denial of
a preliminary injunction was affirmed regarding the reduction of early voting days,
the elimination of the discretion of county boards of elections to keep the polls
open an additional hour on Election Day in "extraordinary circumstances," the
elimination of pre-registration, and the soft roll-out of voter ID requirements." 5
The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings, and as of this
writing, the outcome of the trial is currently pending.
In Veasey v. Abbott, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the Texas
voter identification law (Senate Bill 14) under Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. "6 The plaintiffs claimed that Texas had passed its voter ID bill with a
discriminatory purpose, and argued that the bill would have a discriminatory effect
on Latino voters. 17 The Fifth Circuit vacated the finding that the bill had been
passed with a discriminatory purpose."' The court applied the test for finding
purposeful discriminatory intent as articulated in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, "' and found that the district
court had used the incorrect legal standard and thus could not rely on its findings
that the voter identification law had been passed with discriminatory intent since
the district court placed undue reliance upon the state's history of racially
discriminatory voting laws.' 2 While it remanded the case after this finding for
further proceedings, the Fifth Circuit did hold that the Texas voter ID law had a
"Complaint at 2, League of Women Voters ofNC., 769 F.3d 224 (Nos. 14-1845, 14-1856, 14-
1859).
111 Id.
2 League of Women Voters ofN.C., 769 F.3d at 239.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 241, 248.
"' Id. at 248.
116 Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 493 (5th Cir. 2015).
117 Complaint at 4, 10, Veasey, 796 F.3d at 487 (No. 14-41127).
Veasey, 796 F.3d at 520.
119 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). The
Arlington Heights test applies to finding proof of a discriminatory racial intent behind a facially neutral
law under the equal protection clause. The test is intended to show whether racial discrimination is a
'substantial' or 'motivating' factor behind enactment of the law. Id. at 553-66.
m2 Veasey, 796 F.3d at 498-504.
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discriminatory effect, since statistical evidence concerning voters who lacked or
were unable to obtain the required forms of identification showed a
disproportionate impact on racial minorities.
121
In probably the most recent district court opinion on this issue, the Eastern
District of Virginia recently addressed another mixed Fourteenth Amendment and
Voting Rights Act claim. In Lee v. Virginia Board of Elections'22 at issue was
Virginia's voter identification law, allegations that voting procedures created long
lines at the polling place, and other claims. 123 The Democratic Party plaintiffs here
alleged violations of the Voting Rights Act and the constitutional standards for
voting, in as much as the voter identification policy and the long voting lines
affected African American and Latino voters. 124 On a motion to dismiss, the court
addressed the voter identification claims and the long lines claims separately. 125 As
to voter ID, the court applied the Anderson and Burdick standards and
characterized the plaintiffs' claims as pleading a mixture of facial and class-based
challenges to the Virginia voter ID law, distinguishing the case from Crawford.
126
Additionally, as to the VRA, the Court found sufficient allegations to link the
claim to racial discrimination and upheld those claims. 27 As to the long lines
claims, however, the court dismissed the claims as speculative and at most, instead
concluding that burdens are uniformly shared by all voters. 12' To this end, the court
stressed the fact that Shelby County allowed states "broad powers to determine the
conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised ."
129
From this partial survey, the lower courts have developed a jurisprudence that
has clearly been influenced by the utilitarian frame. Yet, in comparing cases, it
appears that the analytical difference revolves around the degree to which the frame
created by the Anderson/Burdick test is allowed to invade the reasoning under
Section 2. For example, the Sixth Circuit rejected claims that Crawford ought to
allow for, in some cases, mere rational basis review. In Husted, the Sixth Circuit's
Crawford analysis focused on the fact that Crawford itself did not expressly require
that a burden in voting be on all voters to trigger the Crawford balancing.13° Thus,
121 Id. at 513. The Fifth Circuit also reversed the judgment on the plaintiffs' poll tax claim under
the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and Harper v. Vitginia. Id. at 516. The court found that Senate Bill 14
did not impose a poll tax on voters because it did not impose a direct fee on such voters in order to
obtain the photo ID. Id. at 514-17. 1 have argued elsewhere, however, that courts ought to take into
account not only the direct cost of the voting but the indirect costs of voting in assessing the nature of
such claims brought under Harper. See Ellis, The Costofthe Vote, supra note 31, at 1034-36, 1056.
m Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:15CV357-HEH, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118647, at *1
(E.D. Va. Sept. 4, 2015).
w M. at "4, "9.
124 Id. at *1.
12s Id. at 1, *3-*5.
126 Id at *7-*8.
127 See id.
121 d. at "8-'9.
Id. at *9 (quoting Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013).
130 Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 543-44 (6th Cir. 2014),
vacated, 588 Fed. App'x 488 (6th Cir. 2014).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the Sixth Circuit held that "burdens on African American, lower-income, and
homeless voters [do] not automatically mean that only rational basis review or
standard Equal Protection Clause analysis applies." 3' The court then went to
accept and find persuasive under Crawford the statistical evidence provided
concerning the burdens of the Ohio law on the vulnerable groups mentioned as
weighing in the analytical balance regarding the burdens created by the Ohio
law. 32 This broad interpretation of Crawford contrasts with the totality of the
circumstances analysis it performed under Section 2 in as much as it focused
specifically on the evidence of impact of election regulations on African Americans.
In doing so, the Sixth Circuit effectively blurred the doctrinal lines between the
analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment claims under Crawford and the Section 2
theory presented by plaintiffs in Wisconsin based on the general availability of state
issued photo ID. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit relied heavily on the absence of
persuasive evidence of impact to suggest that reasonable regulations should not be
struck down.133 Judge Easterbrook went to great lengths to distinguish a denial of
the right to vote for purposes of a Section 2(a) analysis from the case at bar. He
reasoned that only actions by the state that make it "needlessly" difficult to cast a
vote are actions which violate the VRA.134 He further reasons that Section 2(b)
serves as a limiting factor since voting practices are not made illegal by the act due
to a mere "disparate impact on minorities." 135 Id. This analysis further rests on the
notion that Section 2 cases have been traditionally vote dilution cases rather than
voter qualification cases, and the opinion expressed reticence to extend the totality
of the circumstances doctrine to the later kinds of cases. 136 The opinion goes
further to stress that this equal treatment requirement as the key to the analysis.
13 7
Indeed, the opinion reasons that this equal treatment view ultimately thwarts the
Wisconsin plaintiffs' claim since, at the first step of the Section 2 analysis, the
plaintiffs failed to show a discriminatory burden "because in Wisconsin everyone
has the same opportunity to get a qualifying photo ID."131 It is in this sense that
Frank v. Walker elides the VRA analysis and the Crawford analysis through using
this equal opportunity standard as the applicable first step of the analysis, and thus,
as a threshold matter, using equal opportunity as a measure without inquiry as to
the circumstances proffered by the plaintiffs as to why such equal opportunities
might not be truly "equal."
11Id. at 544.
m Id. at 544-45 (analyzing and finding that burden was significant but not severe appropriate
under Anderson-Burdick balancing).
133 Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 745 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015).
134 Id. at 752-53.
135 Id. at 752.
136 Id. at 753 (relying on the fact that Act 23 "extends to every citizen an equal opportunity to get a
photo ID").
137 Id. at 754.
138 Id. at 755.
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This contrast between the Sixth Circuit's view and the Seventh Circuit's view
illustrates the core conflict regarding the utilitarian balance. In my view, the Sixth
Circuit stressed a flexible view that relies on the interests proffered on both sides of
the balance to look at the denial. I believe this view eschewed a utilitarian balancing
through focusing on the flexibility within the Crawford framework. In contrast, I
believe the Seventh Circuit relied on deference to Wisconsin's interests and
construed the plaintiffs' interest as limited precisely at the point of availability of
the photo ID and as a result the Seventh Circuit sent the implicit message is that
whatever effective denials of the right to vote are outweighed by the governmental
interests.
Ultimately, this suggests that in the context of looking at structural concerns
regarding the right to vote, the utilitarian balancing approach will be imbedded in
the analysis whether the frame is the constitutional standard for voting or the
Voting Rights Act standard concerning antidiscrimination on the basis of race.
Presumably the fact of the balancing of the former is one of the totality of facts and
circumstances of the latter. As a doctrinal matter, these are intertwined, yet as a
matter of whether the legal tests best pursue a goal of insuring the greatest amount
of access to the franchise by all eligible voters, the exclusion of the voter who might
be unduly burdened to meet heightened standards imposed by more rigid voter
access laws may become more certain the more courts defer to state justifications
without further examination of statistical or historical trends.
IV. ECONOMIC PRECARITY, STRUCTURAL RACISM, AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE:
GREATER BIRM[NGHAMMINISTRJES V ALABAMA
While we have seen concerns about efficiency raised squarely in our review of
recent circuit court litigation over voter access rules, thus illustrating the tension
between the antidiscrimination and efficiency norms, the recent case of Greater
Birmingham Ministries v. Alabama3 9 (and specifically the facts surrounding it)
raises a novel variation on the claims brought in Husted, Walker, and the other
issues previously reviewed. The facts of this case suggest another layer of concern
for courts adjudicating these claims-entrenched structures of intersectional
oppression1"° that would, by their very nature, transform the considerations in a
Section 2 analysis but not a Crawford analysis.
139 Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Alabama, No. 2:15-CV-02193-LSC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18891 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 17,2016).
1 By intersectional oppression, I refer to two theories relevant to consideration of voting structures.
The first is the theory of intersectionality, which argues that categories of discrimination should not be
seen in isolation; instead, discrimination should be examined within its multiple dimensions to
understand the separate and overlapping systems of subordination and advantage. See, e.g., Kimberle
Crenshaw, DemarginaLzing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Pobtics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139
(1989) (giving the first law-scholarship related articulation of intersectionality). I have argued elsewhere
that such an intersectional approach is necessary to capture the evolving nature of political subordination
at the intersection of race and class. See Atiba R. Ellis, Race, Class, and Structural Discrimination: On
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The Greater Birmingham Ministries case came to the fore in early October
2015. This took place when al.com reported that the State of Alabama would be
dosing 31 driver part-time driver's license offices located in rural areas of the
state. 141 This was done to close an $11 million cut in the Alabama Law
Enforcement Agency's budget. 142 This is part of a larger set of cutbacks in
governmental services due to budget constraints. 43
John Merrill, Alabama's Secretary of State (and Chief Elections Official)
assured the public that that the closings would not affect access to identification
cards necessary for voting under Alabama's voter ID law. 144 However,
commentators and civil rights activists complained about the risk to the voting
rights for rural black Alabama residents. " ' Along with this furor over the DMV
closures, civil rights groups sued the state of Alabama in December 2015 under the
Voting Rights Act to strike down as discriminatory portions of Alabama's voter
identification law.14 Specifically, plaintiffs seek to force specific guidance or enjoin
Alabama's "Positively Identify Provision" of their voter identification law.147 This
provision allows persons who cannot present one of the seven forms of
identification required under the statute to nonetheless vote if two election officials
are willing to sign affidavits, under penalty of perjury, "positively identifying" the
person as a voter on the poll list who is eligible to vote."4
Plaintiffs Greater Birmingham Ministries and the Alabama Conference of the
NAACP sued to declare the voter identification provisions illegal under the
Vulnerability Within the Poltical Process, 28 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 33 (2015) (articulating a view
based on "political vulnerability" seen through the lens of race and class to respond the jurisprudential
shift represented by the post Shelby County law of vote denial). The second is the idea of structural
racism. Although this could be seen as an underlying premise of the Voting Rights Act, structural
racism is the view that particular structure have evolved over time to create neutral systems that
nonetheless have racially disparate outcomes. See id. The constraints of this Article and the tentative
nature of this case forbid me from offering an extended discussion of either these facts or these concepts,
but they underlie the thinking in this section.141 Lee Roop, State Says Closing Driver's License Offices Won't Limit Access to Voter ID. Cards,
AL.COM (Oct. 2, 2015, 2:03 PM),
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/09/state-says-dosing-driver-lice.html#incartriver-home.
142 Id.
143 Cason, supra note 4.
' Roop, supra note 141.
145 Susan Watson, the Executive Director of the Alabama ACLU, was quoted in the Al.com article
saying that "people are right to be worried" about the closures. "It's going to have a huge impact on the
ability of people to get a state-issued I.D." Roop, supra note 141. Political commentator Kyle Whitmire
argued that the closings would necessarily narrow access to the necessary credential of a driver's license
(or other ID), and thus created the "certainty" of a "civil rights lawsuit." Kyle Whitmire, Opinion, Voter
ID and Drivers License Offce Closures Blackout Alabama's Black Belt, AL.COM (Oct. 2, 2015, 12:17
PM), http://www.al.com/opinion/index.ssf/2015/09/voter id and-driverslicense-o.html.
Commentators characterized the locations where the closings would take place as the poorest counties in
the state. Id.
1'4 See generally Complaint, Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Alabama, 2:15-CV-02193-LSC,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18891 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 2,2015).
147 Id. at 6, 67-68.
148 ALA. CODE § 17-9-30(e) (LEXIS through Act 2016-16 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.).
[Vol. 104
2015-2016] Economic Precarity, Race, and Voting Structures
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Section 2 of the VRA.149 They also
sought a preliminary injunction as to the Positively Identify Provision on the basis
that it violates Section 201 of the Voting Rights Act. i" ° The State of Alabama
argued that this method provides a mechanism by which voters who would
otherwise not be able to vote may do so. 51 While the case is ongoing as of this
writing, and ultimately may serve as another example of the dual litigation problem
described in the preceding section, the district court denied plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction on the Positively Identify Provision.1 52
While this is the heart of the suit, it happens against the backdrop of economic
precarity noted at the beginning of this paper. The DMV closures that correlated
with the legal issues in this lawsuit took place in areas of extreme poverty.153 Keesha
Gaskins and Sundeep Iyer of the Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University examined this correlation: "More than 135,000 eligible voters live in
these 11 counties. Nearly half of them are black, and the black poverty rate is 41
percent."154 Gaskins and Iyer use this data in combination with other information
to demonstrate the level of burden of access that poor (and largely minority) voters
have to the voter identification regime.15 5 And this analysis was created well before
the closures described in this Article.5 6
This economic precarity and its likely affects on the ability to access appropriate
voter identification, coupled with Alabama's particular history regarding voting,
suggests that a court examining this lawsuit under the "totality of the
circumstances" may find the voter identification provisions violate Section 2 the
VRA. Such a finding would be consistent with the majority view of VRA doctrine
traced in this paper. Moreover, it would be consistent in thinking about the
particular vulnerability that arises from an intersectional analysis of the problems of
poverty and race-both in Alabama generally and in the black belt of Alabama in
particular-which would leave persons with less than total access to identification
cards who thus are dependent on the attestation of two elections officials for voting
vulnerable to those officials' whim and caprice.
149 Complaint at 64-67, Greater Birmingham Ministries, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18891.
"O Id. at 67. Section 201 prohibits denials of the right to vote on the basis that the voter fails to
comply with any "test or device" that may serve as a prerequisite to voting. Greater Birmingham
Ministries, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18891, at *25.
151 See Greater Birmingham Ministries, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18891, at *32.
112 Id. The district court reasoned that the Positively Identify Provision acted as a secondary form of
identification rather than a requirement that must be met prior to voting. Id. at *27-*28. As such, the
district court found that the plaintiffs would not likely succeed under Section 201 of the VRA. Id.
5 3Whitmire, supra note 145.
L14 KEESHA GASKINS & SUNDEEP IYER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
OBTAINING VOTER IDENTIFICATION 7 (2012),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/VRE/Chalenge of Obtaining-Vo
ter ID.pdf.
155 Id. at 14-15.
"' This analysis was most recently updated in July of 2012, id at i, while this Article was written
and will be published in 2016.
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However, the central point of this paper is that such considerations may be-
and have recently been-dominated by the state-focused utilitarian balance
developed through the Crawford line of jurisprudence. From this point of view,
such a law can be seen as a benefit to voters because they would have, as the state
has argued, the net benefits of the voter identification scheme, i.e., the prevention
of (speculative claims of) fraud and the efficiencies gained by the government in
administering the right to vote. Moreover, the state could argue that these
allowances would facilitate voting without added cost. And given the underlying
deference to allow states discretion in innovation, and absent explicit discriminatory
intent, a persuasive case could be made to the extent that Crawford-oriented
thinking affects the process of analyzing these claims.
This shows the possibility of different outcomes based upon the conceptual lens
that the utilitarian balancing approach has imposed on modem election law
thinking. Though Crawford is dearly settled law, it should not be applied
uncritically or without due regard to its doctrinal limitations, especially within the
context of dealing with voting claims related to race. It is this dynamic (and the
underlying problem of racialized political vulnerability that drives it) to which
lawmakers and judges should be sensitive in adjudicating and legislating about such
issues in the foreseeable future.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Ultimately, this Article seeks to point to a multi-layered dynamic of structural
interference with the right to vote for those at the margins of the electorate-that is,
those who are unable to negotiate the cumulative burdens imposed by the increase
in voting regulations and thus face substantial barriers in participating in the
franchise. The Crawford-dominated reasoning that spurs the utilitarian focus
within Fourteenth Amendment election law privileges the interests of the state in
administering election laws efficiently (that is, at heightened levels of rigor with the
cost of such hyper-regulation shifted to the voters rather than borne by the state).
This creates a disincentive for these structures to address concerns regarding
structural disenfranchisement that prevent those at the margins form participating.
This mode of thinking influences how traditional dual Crawford and VRA claims
are brought, thus putting the antidiscrimination principle of election law at tension
with this efficiency interest. And, as the Alabama voter identification situation
suggests, failings in the economic structure directly impacts the election structure
itself, thus adding another layer of structural exclusion for those unable to
ultimately bear the cost of the vote. In other words, there is a possibility that the
burdens on the state in administering the right to vote may become a focal point of
future Crawford-style litigation.
The utilitarian focus sets in arguable conflict the individual rights of voters who
perceived themselves as structurally disenfranchised against the mechanisms that
determine the collective good. In this light, this Article argues that legislators and
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courts should reconsider this underlying dynamic and align the competing
principles concerning the right to vote so to maximize participation.
The solutions that are possible are various. Many have argued that a revived
Section 5 preclearance scheme which would restore the federal government's
interpositionary power regarding direct and indirect structural voting rights
changes in jurisdictions like Alabama where such history and potential for
discrimination would be present. While such ideas would address the present
situation, such a remedy would be insufficient to deal with the situations where this
concern would manifest in other jurisdictions which may not otherwise fall under a
revised Section 4(b) preclearance formula or would otherwise be subject to either a
Section 2 racial discrimination suit or may fall out of coverage of the Voting Rights
Act altogether. I have argued as a consistent thread in my voting rights scholarship
that in a readjustment of the balance to defer to voter interests instead of state
interests is necessary antecedent to addressing this problem."5 7 But the Alabama
voter identification-budget shortfall dilemma suggests that even this presumption
should be even more nuanced.
Perhaps the simplest solution is to reconsider how courts addressing these dual
claims ought to approach them.118 As I observed above, the Sixth Circuit, on the
evidence presented to it, was dearly open to an intersectional approach by taking
into account the factors of poverty, race, and history to show the precarity of
minority voters in the electoral process in and of itself, while searching for rigor in
analyzing the doctrinally distinct claims. This balancing stands in stark contrast
with the approach of the Seventh Circuit, which apparently took as the starting
premise the benefits of the choice (and the efficiency values contained therein) of a
voter identification law and then summarily rejected the counterarguments thereto.
This clearly shows the differences in premises, and suggests that the risk of
precarity to minority poor voters (or even poor voters generally) should be the
starting point of the analysis (to the extent the evidence allows).
While pointing to the Sixth Circuit as a model of relative doctrinal clarity may
be satisfactory, it is only so to a certain extent. What is more important is the
ultimate premise espoused in the court's opinion. The Sixth Circuit's opinion
comes the closest to an intersectional approach that articulates and weighs the
relative dimensions of structural disenfranchisement. This is a necessary step to
create an effective frame for analyzing right to vote problems and combat the
efficiency interest (and its possible disregard for the effective disenfranchisement of
some voters) under either a Crawford or a VRA approach. As to the VRA, an
intersectional approach remains true to the "totality of the circumstances" model
embedded in Section 2. Similar analysis within the Crawford model would bring
157 See, e.g, Ellis, The Cost of the Vote, supra note 31, at 1066-68 (arguing that the Crawford
analysis should be reframed to account for the indirect socioeconomic cost of obtaining voting
credentials).
"' This thought comes directly from dialogue at the symposium and the helpful question posed by
Daniel P. Tokaji in response to my presentation.
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more depth to the "interests of the voter" within that context and recognize that
such interests are not necessarily visible in terms of ultimate effects. Ultimately, it is
this reformulating of the premises that is necessary to make a more robust right to
vote in this era of recalibration of the right to vote.
